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MANUFACTURERS' LIMITATIONS OF WARRANTIES:
AIRCRAFT DAMAGE
ROBERT S. HARKEY*
N MOST aviation litigation the attention centers around death
and personal injury claims. There is, however, another aspect
which must be dealt with-the damage or destruction of the air-
craft. The purpose of this presentation will be to discuss, from the
aircraft owner's standpoint, the effect and validity of manufactur-
ers' limitations of warranties with respect to aircraft damage and
to survey some of the theories and cases under which the effect and
validity of such limitations may be determined.
The warranty provisions applicable to a particular aircraft may
be negotiated and quite complex, as in the case of a contract be-
tween a manuafacturer and an airline for the purchase of a large
passenger aircraft. Or, the provisions may be unilaterally imposed
and no more complicated than an automobile warranty, as in the
case of the sale of small general aviation aircraft. In almost all
cases, however, the warranty provisions will include: (1) an express
warranty against defects in material and workmanship, (2) a state-
ment of the extent or limit of the manufacturer's liability for any
such defect, and (3) a disclaimer by the manufacturer of all other
warranties, whether express or implied.
When an aircraft is damaged or destroyed by a defect which the
owner believes to be the responsibility of the manufacturer, there
are three basic theories of liability under which the owner may at-
tempt to avoid the manufacturer's attempts at limiting its warran-
ties: (1) express warranty, (2) implied warranty and (3) strict
liability. Each of these theories is discussed below.
* B.A. Emory University, LL.B. Emory University School of Law. Mr. Har-
key is General Attorney for Delta Airlines, Inc., in Atlanta, Georgia.
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I. EXPRESS WARRANTY
After providing that the aircraft will be free from defects in ma-
terial and workmanship (and possibly from other defects such as
defects in design, defects arising from selection of material, or de-
fects in the process of manufacture), the typical warranty provi-
sion will go on to provide that the extent of the manufacturer's lia-
bility for any such defect will be to repair or replace the defective
part, or possibly to repair any such defect in the aircraft.
Assuming that the aircraft is either destroyed or substantially
damaged as a result of a defect covered by the warranty, the initial
question is whether the manufacturer is liable for the damage under
the express warranty. Upon receipt of a claim, the manufacturer
normally will deny the defect, but contend that in any event its lia-
bility is limited to replacement of the defective part or to repair of
the defect. This, in effect, amounts to no remedy at all if the aircraft
is destroyed or substantially damaged. Placing aside other theories
of liability for the moment, does the plaintiff have any basis by
which to proceed under an express warranty theory? It seems that
the answer is yes. There are at least three approaches: ( 1 ) the war-
ranty should be interpreted to include liability for damages result-
ing from covered defects, (2) if the warranty is not so interpreted
it has failed "of its essential purpose" under section 2-719(2) of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and (3) the limitation on
damages is unconscionable under section 2-719(3) of the UCC.
Warranty Interpretation
The first approach is a matter of contract interpretation. The us-
ual warranty provision does not specifically address itself to the
question of the manufacturer's responsibility if the aircraft is sub-
stantially damaged or destroyed as a result of a defect. This may
result in an ambiguity as to the meaning of the warranty. What was
intended by the parties if the contract was negotiated, or what was
the purchaser reasonably to have understood in the case of a pro-
vision unilaterally imposed by the manufacturer and/or dealer?
The answer to this question will depend upon the circumstances of
a particular case, the specific warranty language involved, and the
law of the state under which the warranty must be interpreted. It
may be feasible in many cases, however, to contend that the war-
ranty should be interpreted to mean that the manufacturer is liable
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for the entire cost of repairing or replacing the aircraft and possibly
for other damages.
Perhaps the leading case utilizing this approach is Rose v. Chry-
sler Motors Corporation,' which involved a defect arising under a
new automobile warranty. The automobile was substantially de-
stroyed by a fire which apparently resulted from a defect in the
wiring system. The warranty provided that the automobile would
be free from defects in material and workmanship and limited the
liability of the dealer to "making good at our place of business,
without charge for replacement labor, any part or parts ... which
our examination shall disclose.., to have been thus defective.'
Applying California contract interpretation principles, the court
concluded that the warranty could not be intended to apply separ-
ately to "each of the thousands of connected and interdependent
parts," as the defendants contended.! Instead, the court found that
the warranty applied to the automobile as a whole.
Without in any way attempting to set the limits of responsibility
created by this warranty agreement it appears a reasonable inter-
pretation thereof that . . . the responsibility of the warrantors
extends to making all necessary adjustments and replacing all parts
which are required because of defective workmanship or materials
existing in the vehicle considered as a whole and without regard
to whether or not an individual part was originally defective, per
se.'
The trial court's award of the full amount of damages caused by
the burning of the automobile was affirmed. ' The Rose case has
been followed by a number of courts in interpreting the express
warranty to the automobile as a whole and imposing responsibility
upon the warrantor for damages to the vehicle flowing from a de-
fect.'
1212 Cal. App. 2d 755, 28 Cal. Rptr. 185, 99 A.L.R.2d 1411 (1963).
2Id. at 187.
3 Id.
4 1d. at 188.
3 In he course of its opinion the court cited with approval Allen v. Brown,
181 Kan. 301, 310 P.2d 923 (1957); Cobb v. Truett, 11 So. 2d 120 (La. App.
1942); Peterson Co. v. Parrott, 129 Me. 381, 152 A. 313 (1930). See also Jarnot
v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
'See, e.g., Ford Motor Car v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 465 S.W.2d 80 (1971);
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Cox Motor v. Car Co. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1966); Russo v. Hilltop
1975]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Interpretation of an express warranty, therefore, presents a pos-
sible basis for recovery for damage or destruction of an aircraft,
even though the language of the warranty might at first appear to
limit the manufacturer's responsibility only to replacement or re-
pair of defective parts.
Failure of Essential Purpose Under the UCC
A second approach to express warranty limitations is provided
by section 2-719 of the UCC. This section states that an agreement
may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those
provided in the UCC and that the agreement may limit or alter the
measure of damages recoverable, e.g., limiting the buyer's remedies
to a return of defective goods and repayment of the price or to re-
pair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts. Section
2-719 further provides in subsection (2) that:
Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in
this Act."
The Official Comment to section 2-719 states, with respect to sub-
section (2), that "where an apparently fair and reasonable clause
because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to deprive
either part of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way
to the general remedy provisions of this Article."'
Remedies provided under the UCC sales article include those
specified in sections 2-714(3) and 2-715. Section 2-714(3) pro-
vides for both incidental and consequential damages following a
breach by the seller. Section 2-715 defines incidental damages to
include any "reasonable expense incident to a delay or other
breach"' and defines consequential damages to include "injury to
personal property proximately resulting from any breach of war-
ranty."'" Thus, where the circumstances show that a limited remedy
fails of its essential purpose, the UCC provides alternative relief
which may include damages for reasonable expenses and injury to
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 479 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. App. 1972); Vernon v. Lake Motors,
26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971). In the Cox Motor Car Co. case, the court
considered a whole truck to be "one big defective part."
7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2-719(2).
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719, Comment 1.
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715(1).
'
0 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-715(2) (b).
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personal property. In the case of damage to or destruction of an
aircraft resulting from a defect covered under the typical warranty
which limits the remedy to replacement or repair of defective parts,
section 2-719(2) might often be applicable.
It seems clear that the "essential purpose" of the warranty is to
protect the purchaser from defects covered under the warranty. The
limited remedy of replacement or repair of a defective part is per-
fectly adequate when a defective part is discovered, or should be
discovered, prior to causing any other damage. This is the situation
addressed by most warranties. On the other hand, when the defect
is not reasonably discoverable by the purchaser and it results in
damage to or destruction of the aircraft, the remedy is totally inad-
equate and amounts to no remedy at all. Indeed, there may have
been no defective part at all, but only a failure to properly assemble
the aircraft, i.e., a defect in workmanship or process of manufac-
ture. Under these circumstances, if the contract is interpreted to
limit the liability of the manufacturer to replacement of defective
parts, the "essential purpose" of providing protection to the pur-
chaser from defects has failed. Moreover, if the limited remedy is
applied, the purchaser would be deprived of the "substantial value
of the bargain" referred to in the Official Comment" because the
purchaser may have lost the entire value of the airplane.
While I found no cases which apply section 2-719(2) to aircraft
warranties, there are several cases in which this section has been
construed; the principles of section 2-719(2) relied on in those
cases would seem to have equal application to limited or exclusive
remedies in connection with aircraft warranties.
In Neville Chemical Company v. Union Carbide Corporation,"
the court dealt with damages resulting from a chemical contami-
nant which had been introduced into the product of the seller, but
which was not reasonably discoverable until after the product had
been processed by the purchaser, furnished to manufacturers and
further processed into consumer goods. The contract for the sale
of the product required the purchaser to advise the seller of any
defects within 15 days and limited the remedy for any defect to
return of the purchase price. The court concluded that this remedy
was designed to cover a situation where the defect is discoverable
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719, Comment 1.
1 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968), afl'd, 422 F.2d 1205 (3rd Cir. 1970).
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upon receipt of the product, but that the remedy was ineffective
when the defect is not ordinarily discoverable, saying that under the
latter circumstances "such a remedy is far below a bare minimum
in quantity, and is ineffective under the Uniform Commercial
Code, §2-719(2)."'" Similarly, in the case of a latent defect in an
aircraft which is not discoverable until the defect has caused dam-
age or destruction to the aircraft, the limited remedy of replacing
or repairing a defective part is of no value, and unless a remedy is
provided under the UCC, the purchaser would be deprived of
"the substantial value of the bargain.".
In two other cases,'5 both arising in Illinois, section 2-719(2)
was held applicable where the seller allegedly repudiated its obli-
gation under an exclusive or limited remedy. This repudiation was
considered to have caused the restricted remedy to fail of its essen-
tial purpose, opening to the plaintiff the general array of remedies
under the UCC. In Adams v. J. I. Case, Company," the court said:
It should be obvious that they [the seller] cannot at once repudiate
their obligation under their warranty and assert its provisions bene-
ficial to them. Thus, the allegations . . . of plaintiff's complaint
invoke other provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Sec-
tion 2-719(2) provides: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive
or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be
had as provided in this Act.' '
The court stated further that failure of the exclusive remedy was
easily found where the seller had willfully failed to honor its obli-
gation under the exclusive remedy and that the plaintiff could re-
cover damages under UCC section 2-714, including incidental
and consequential damages as defined in section 2-715, if appro-
priate circumstances were proved.
Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corporation' involved a
similar question resulting from the seller's alleged failure to honor
its obligations under a contract to manufacture and deliver certain
13 Id. at 655.
14See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(2), Comment 1.
15 Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill.
1970).
11 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
1'261 N.E.2d at 8.
18320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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equipment. Following the rationale of the Adams case, the court
said:
If the plaintiff is capable of sustaining its burden of proof as to the
allegations it has made, the defendant will be deemed to have
repudiated the warranty agreement so far as restricting plaintiff's
remedies, and the exclusive remedy provision of the contract will
be deemed under the circumstances to have failed of its essential
purpose, thus allowing plaintiff the general array of remedies under
the Code.'
In disposing of the defendant's contentions that the exclusion of
consequential damages is authorized under section 2-719 (3), the
court said:
However, §2-719(2) refers in all cases to the failure of an ex-
clusive remedy, irrespective of the fact that the remedy may be
generally authorized under the Code. The fact that the exclusion
of consequential damages is authorized under §2-719(3) does not
lead to the conclusion that §2-719(2) was not intended to cover
the situation where, as here, a seller limits his liability to one ex-
clusive albeit authorized remedy. On the contrary, the Official
Comment on this Section speaks in broad and general terms."
Thus the court clearly distinguished the UCC's authorization of
exclusive remedies from the failure of an exclusive remedy to meet
its essential purpose, and found that utilization of an exclusive
remedy does not preclude recovery as provided for in section 2-
719(2).
Koehring Co. v. A.P.I. Incorporated," followed the Adams and
Birdsboro cases and contains a discussion of several other cases
construing section 2-719(2). A lower court applied section 2-719
(2) to an automobile warranty limitation in Riley v. Ford Motor
Company.' In Riley, the Fifth Circuit found that excessive dam-
ages had been awarded by the jury, but found no error in the appli-
cation of section 2-719(2) to the fact situation. In Reynolds v.
Preferred Mutual Insurance Co.," it was held that the section was
applicable when a contractor had installed defective gutters which
19 id. at 44.
1 Id. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
1 319 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
22442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971).
"3 11 U.C.C. REp. SERV. 701 (Mass. 1972).
1975]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
resulted in damage to the purchaser's house. The court concluded
that if damages were limited to replacement of the gutters as pro-
vided in the warranty, without remedy for damages to the house,
the purchaser would be deprived of the substantial value of the
bargain. It was held, therefore, that the exclusive remedy had fail-
ed and that plaintiff could recover for damage to the house.
While these cases did not involve aircraft warranties, the princi-
ples involved would apply equally whether the product involved
were an automobile, a gutter, or an aircraft. Thus it seems clear
that section 2-719(2) could and should be applied to aircraft war-
ranties when the circumstances show that a limited or exclusive
remedy has failed of its essential purpose.
Unconscionable Limitations Under the UCC
A third approach to attacking the validity of a warranty limita-
tion on damages arises under section 2-719(3) of the UCC. That
section provides:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequen-
tial damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods
is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the
loss is commercial is not.
Section 2-302 of the UCC also is relevant and provides generally
that a court may refuse to enforce contract provisions which the
court finds to be unconscionable as a matter of law.
It would seem clear that under appropriate circumstances the
limitation of a manufacturer's liability to replacement of parts or a
similar limitation could be unconscionable and, therefore, unen-
forceable. In determining unconscionability, the courts can be ex-
pected to weigh all of the circumstances, including the commercial
setting, the relative bargaining positions of the parties, the avail-
ability of alternative sources of the product, and other similar con-
siderations. The statement of a Massachusetts court in Reynolds v.
Preferred Mutual Insurance Company,2" probably demonstrates the
typical factors which would be considered in applying section 2-
719(3). There the court said:
Whether a contract or any clause of the contract is unconscionable
is a matter for the court to decide against the background of a
4Id.
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contract's commercial setting, purpose and effect. [Citation Omit-
ted] "The principle is one of prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise." [Citation Omitted] Unfair surprise is determined by
many factors. "These factors include the relation of the parties,
whether the seller sought out the customer or whether the custom-
er sought out the seller, the sales techniques involved, whether all
form contracts in this industry contain the same clause, thereby
preventing this buyer from shopping on better terms, and how un-
expected the clause is in this type of transaction." R. J. Nordstrom,
Handbook of the Law of Sales, 1970, at p. 128.'
When the totality of circumstances indicates essential unfairness
which the purchaser could not have been reasonably expected to
avoid, it seems likely that unconscionableness will be found. The
chances of finding unconscionability would appear to decrease as
the size and sophistication of the purchaser increases. An individual
faced with a standard contract certainly would be in a better posi-
tion to advance unconscionability as a basis for voiding a limita-
tion on damages than a large corporation which is on a relatively
equal footing with the seller.
For example, a statement in a Georgia case involving an indi-
vidual consumer indicates that a clause in an automobile warranty
which limits the seller's liability in any event to replacement or
repair of defective parts is unconscionable per se."8 On the other
hand, in Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corporation,"' where both parties were sizable corporations, a war-
ranty provision limiting damages to repair or replacement of parts
was upheld."
Unconscionableness thus may be a basis for striking down a limi-
tation of a manufacturer's warranty in the case of an individual pur-
chaser of a small general aviation aircraft. In theory it should also
apply, under appropriate circumstances, to corporate purchasers,
but as a practical matter it would not appear to be as viable when
the aircraft purchaser is an airline or other sizeable corporation.
2Id. at 707.
1 Jacobs v. Metro-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d
250 (1972).
"7422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1970).
28 See also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., 238 Cal.
App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965), a pre-UCC case which did not deal spe-
cifically with unconscionableness, but which did discuss related concepts.
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II. IMPLIED WARRANTY
It is in the area of the second basic theory of liability-implied
warranty-that manufacturers most specifically attempt to limit
their liabilities. The actions of manufacturers result, no doubt,
from the specfic UCC provisions relating to implied warranties.
Section 2-314 of the UCC provides for an implied warranty of
merchantability, and section 2-315 provides for an implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Section 2-316, however,
sets out rules under which these warranties may be excluded or
disclaimed. The question which normally will arise when an air-
craft is damaged or destroyed is whether the manufacturer suc-
cessfully has utilized the disclaimer rules.
The most pertinent portions of section 2-316 of the UCC pro-
vide as follows:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the im-
plied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language
must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Lan-
guage to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it
states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend
beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all
faults" or other language which in common understanding calls
the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes
plain that there is no implied warranty;
Questions often arise as to the validity of an attempted disclaimer
because of ambiguity in the disclaimer language, failure of the
language to comply with the specific requirements of section 2-316,
or for a variety of reasons which might be present in any particu-
lar case.
A typical case is Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Mally.9 In that case
the court found that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose resulted from the negotiations of the parties with respect
to the sale and purchase of a used helicopter. The seller had
actually pointed out and demonstrated particular uses to which the
29329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964).
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helicopter could be put. The warranty provision of the contract
contained no specific warranty against defects and provided that
a warranty of title was "accepted in lieu of any and all other war-
ranties, expressed or implied, arising out of the sale of the heli-
copter." The seller contended that this exclusion of warranties
covered any implied warranty of fitness. Applying Pennsylvania's
1958 version of the UCC, the court concluded that the disclaimer
did not exclude the implied warranty of fitness because the dis-
claimer was not in "specific language" and was ambiguous, con-
trary to the requirements of the UCC for an effective disclaimer.
The court went on to say that the result would have been the same
under the 1959 version of the UCC because the writing was not
"conspicuous" as required under the later version. The court noted
that the type was of the same color and size as that of other pro-
visions of the contract. 1
In Holcomb v. Cessna Aircraft Company,' a similar result was
reached. The warranty involved was quite typical. It covered de-
fects in material and workmanship, limited the manufacturer's
obligation to replacement of defective parts, and provided that:
This warranty is expressly in lieu of any other warranties, ex-
pressed or implied, including any implied warranty or [of] mer-
chantability or fitness for a particular purpose.... ."
Relying only upon the language of the UCC itself, the court con-
cluded that since the disclaimer language was in the same size type
as the rest of the agreement, implied warranties were not excluded
by the disclaimer. The court specifically relied on section 1-201 of
the UCC in interpreting the "conspicuous" requirement of section
2-316. Section 1-201 provides, in pertinent part, that language is
conspicuous "if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color.""
Other questions can arise in connection with the validity of a
disclaimer, such as whether it was actually part of the agreement
between the parties. When, for example, the disclaimer is contained
in a warranty which is not delivered to the purchaser until after the
I01d. at 588.
I11d. at 593.
32439 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 1157.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 1-201.
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sale is complete, the disclaimer may be held to have no effect.'
There are literally scores of cases dealing with the validity of
disclaimers and they are by no means consistent. It is necessary,
therefore, with respect to any particular case to examine the de-
cisions applicable to the specific circumstances of the case.
III. STRICT LIABILITY
While strict liability in tort, by definition, is not a warranty theory
of recovery, its application has the practical effect of emasculating
any attempt by a manufacturer to limit its warranty obligations, or
at least of making them unimportant. As provided in section 402A
of the Restatement of Torts (Second), strict liability applies to one
who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user of his property, whether or not the seller has exercised all
possible care.
The doctrine of strict liability, of course, now has become well-
established in American jurisprudence, although it is not consis-
tently accepted and applied in all jurisdictions. While the cases are
not consistent, it would appear that at least in many jurisdictions
strict liability may be applied to aircraft damage or destruction,
even though no personal injuries are present.
In Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.' a federal court in
Chicago held that the doctrine of strict liability as expressed in
section 402A of the Restatement had been adopted in the state of
Washington, citing Ulmer v. Ford Motor Company." The court
then applied the doctrine to Boeing, the manufacturer of an aircraft
which had crashed in Rome, Italy, because of a defect in a thrust
reverser system. Although the Manos case did involve deaths and
personal injuries, the rationale of that case and of the Restatement
does not depend upon personal injury being involved. Indeed, the
Restatement refers to physical harm "caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property."'
The reasons for the doctrine of strict liability apply equally to
"Ford Motor Co. v. Taylor, 60 Tenn. App. 271, 446 S.W.2d 521 (1969);
See also Trane Co. v. Gilbert, 267 Cal. App. 2d 720, 73 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1968).
It would seem that these cases might be applicable to some sales of general avia-
tion aircraft.
3"324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
"775 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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physical harm to the person and physical harm to property and it
was so recognized in Seely v. White Motor Co." In Seely the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court said: "Physical injury to the property is so
akin to personal injury that there is no reason for distinguishing
them."
The basis for the initial development of strict liability was to
keep defective products from making their way to the market place
where they become a menace to the public and part of the rationale
of the doctrine is to discourage the marketing of such products.
In the landmark strict liability case of Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., ' the California Supreme Court relied, inter alia, on
the rationale set out in a concurring opinion in the earlier case of
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co." In Escola the court said:
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of prod-
ucts having defects that are a menace to the public. If such prod-
ucts nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public
interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may
cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in
the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the
market. '
In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Company," it was held that con-
tractual attempts to limit liability through warranty disclaimers are
immaterial. Justice Traynor explained the logic of the holding,
saying:
Since Maywood Bell is strictly liable in tort, the fact that it re-
stricted its contractual liability is immaterial. Regardless of the
obligations it assumed by contract, it is subject to strict liability
in tort because it is in the business of selling automobiles, one of
which proved defective. '
A similar result was reached in Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co.,"'
where the court said "the seller cannot disclaim or by contract alter
" 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 13 A.L.R. 3d 1049 (1962).
4'24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
I' d. at 461, 150 P.2d at 441.
4'63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
43 Id. at __, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
"61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
"Id. at -, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900. The court also held that
the doctrine applies to dealers as well as manufacturers.
" 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
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a duty which the law would impose upon him."" And in the Seely
case the court said, "Moreover, this liability could not be dis-
claimed, for one of the purposes of strict liability in tort is to pre-
vent a manufacturer from defining the scope of his responsibility
for harm caused by his products.'"
In several other cases, strict liability has been held applicable to
property damage, including the defective product itself," and to
property damage as between commercial entities."
It seems clear then that strict liability is a viable basis for re-
covery for damage to aircraft resulting from defects which might
also be breaches of warranty, even if the manufacturer has dis-
claimed its warranty liability or limited it to replacement or repair
of defective parts. There are two recent cases, however, which seem
to run contrary to Vandermark, Greeno and Seely because they
hold that a manufacturer may by contract relieve itself from strict
liability obligations to an aircraft purchaser. These cases are Key-
stone. Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrim Corp.,' and Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation." In both of these
cases the courts relied heavily on the prior case of Delta Air Lines,
Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc.,"M in which the doctrine of
strict liability was not truly before the court.
The Keystone court, applying Pennsylvania law, made a policy
decision that in a commercial setting corporate parties should be
allowed to allocate the risks and that it would be unwise to hold
that strict liability applies in those circumstances. In the second
Delta case the Fifth Circuit applied California law, but did not
attempt to distinguish cases such as Vandermark, Greeno and
Seely. Instead, it noted that while the court in the first Delta case
did not expressly mention strict liability, it had discussed Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, the leading case on strict liability,
and nevertheless held that Douglas could exculpate itself of tort
47 Id. at 429.
4 63 Cal. 2d at -, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
19 Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
5 Dealers Transport Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1965); Lamphiear v. Skagit Corp., 6 Wash. App. 350, 493 P.2d 1018
(1972).
11 364 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
52 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974).
547 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965).
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liability.' The court thus concluded that under California law
strict liability could be disclaimed as between two large commercial
entities.
I represented Delta in the second Delta case, and I must respect-
fully disagree that this is a correct interpretation of the law of
California. I believe it is clear that on the question of strict liability
the law of California is set out in Vandermark and Seely and not
in the first (or second) Delta case. The first Delta case was decided
by an intermediate appellate court which did not squarely consider
the question of whether a manufacturer may by contract relieve
itself of strict liability imposed by law. In the second Delta case,
however, the Fifth Circuit relied on the first Delta case instead of
Vandermark and Seely, cases in which the California Supreme
Court had dealt specifically with this issue and held that strict lia-
bility may not be negated by contract. It would seem that Vander-
mark and Seely are more authoritative on the issue than the first
Delta case, and that a forceful argument still can be made that
strict liability may not be disclaimed by contract.
CONCLUSION
The cases show that there are a number of possibilities for re-
covery for damage to an aircraft, despite the manufacturer's at-
tempts to limit its warranties. Much depends, however, upon the
particular language of the warranty, the circumstances of the case,
the decisions of the applicable jurisdiction, the status of the parties,
and any other factors which may be important in a particular case.
503 F.2d at 245.
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